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Abstract: Due to the profound influence of banking crisis on economic growth, the capital 
adequacy has been closely concerned by financial authorities in many nations. Thanks to 
globalization of business, the financing environment has improved. Therefore, a number of 
restrictions on banking sectors has been not as tough as once were.  
However, the requirements on capital adequacy have been stricter than ever. Yet the behavior 
adjustment of banking sectors and its effects on every aspects of national economy still provokes 
controversy. As various theories and abundant evidences indicate --- the implementation of Basel 
Agreement would lead to social credit crunch due to the fact that national commercial banks reduce 
credit transaction in order to meet the requirement of capital regulation(8%), which would 
negatively affect the stability of macro-economy.  
This thesis intents to answer, via theoretical analysis and demonstration in banking system of 
Hubei Province, the question of potential adjustment and shrinking effects after implanting Capital 
Regulation of Commercial Banks. We believe since the implementing of new principle in 2004, 
each bank has adjusted their gross and structure of credit. The effect of credit crunch is mainly seen 
by the impacts on small and middle sized enterprises. 
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Résumé:  En raison de l’influence profonde de la crise bancaire sur la croissance économique, les 
autorités financières de beaucoup de pays prêtent une grande attention à la suffisance du capital. 
Grâce à la globalisation du commerce, l’environnment financier s’est amélioré. Donc, de 
nombreuses restrictions dans le secteur bancaire ne sont plus aussi dures qu’elles étaient autrefois. 
 Cependant, l’exigence de la suffisance du capital est plus stricte qu’auparavant. L’ajustement 
du secteur bancaire et son influence sur tous les aspects de l’économie nationale provoquent quant 
même des controverses. De diverses théories et des preuves abondantes indiquent que l’application 
de Basel Agreement pourrait conduire au resserrement de crédit dû au fait que les banques 
commerciales réduisent leur offre de crédit afin de répondre à la demande de la régulation du 
capital(8%), ce qui pourrait affecter négativement la stabilité de la macro-économie. 
L’essai présent tente de répondre, par le biais de l’analyse théorique et la démonstration du 
système bancaire de la province du Hubei, à la question de l’ajustement potentiel et des effets 
diminutifs après la mise en oeuvre de la Régulation du Capital des Banques Commerciales. Nous 
croyont, depuis la mise en application du nouveau principe en 2004, chaque banque a ajusté leur 
total et structure du crédit. Les effets du resserrement de crédit se voient principalement dans ses 
influences sur les petites et moyennes entreprises. 
Mots-Clés:  suffisance du capital, motivation de la prise de risque, resserrement de crédit 
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1.  INTRODUCTION 
 
Banking crisis has profound influence on a nation’s 
economy. Consequently, the capital adequacy has been 
the key issue of financial authorities. Thanks to 
globalization, many previous restrictions on banking 
sectors have been removed whereas more severe 
restrictions on capital are introduced. Capital 
management is currently strengthened in China as well. 
According to Capital Regulation of Commercial Banks 
issued in 2004, the first day of January was the deadline 
of capital adequacy, since when China’s banking 
management has been a new stage. The adequacy of 
capital of banks, however, has been commonly low, 
which breeds high stress to each bank which has to 
adapt to risk-taking incentives and credit behavior. This 
factor has been included in share redistribution of 
commercial banks.   
A question, naturally, arise: is credit crunch a 
necessary outcome by capital adequacy management? Is 
credit crunch unavoidable when carry out Capital 
Regulation of Commercial Banks? This paper intends to 
offer an answer, via theoretical analysis and examples in 
banking system of Hubei Province, to these questions. 
The rapidly-changing financial innovation of 
international banking has produced complicated 
financial risks, which is out of control of the old Basel 
Agreement. Therefore, a supplement was added by 
Basel Committee in 1996, which put market risk into 
capital management. They proposed the The new Basel 
Capital Accord II  in 2004, which is composed by three 
major sections: the minimum capital adequacy, 
management of authorities, and market discipline. The 
new agreement offers more comprehensive techniques 
to handle various, including credit, market, and 
operational, risks.  
 
 2.  RISK-TAKING INCENTIVES 
UNDER CAPITAL REGULATION  
 
The requirement of capital requirement would reduce 
bank’s risk-taking incentives (Furlong and 
Keeley,1989).On the contrary, Jurg Blum (1999) believe 
it would increase risks via a dynamic analysis. As a 
reference of Jurg Blum’s structure (1999), we establish 
a one-period model in order to analyze the impacts of 
capital adequacy regulation on bank risk taking.  
Hypothesis:  
(1) Banking capital is W, deposit is D, the duration 
of deposit and loan are one period , when time t = 0, 
banks absorb deposit and invest on loan. If T = 1, banks 
take back loan and pay for deposit rates C (D). 
(2) The competition of banking is incomplete 
because every single banking sector would change its 
interest rate accordingly (China’s banks apply floating 
range rate). Increasing rate (dominant and recessive trait) 
would increase overall deposit. As a result, C′(D) > 0，
且 C′(D) > C(D)/D. 
(3) Customers are not sensitive to capital volume of 
banks and the determining factor is interest rate.  
(4) If capital is fully used for loan, the rate of return 
from a loan is a random variable of the binomial 
distribution:
 Here, p(x) 
is the probability of event x; x is the expected return of 
related loan with random risk. The higher x is, the lower 
probability of keeping contract is -- that is, the potential 
risk is higher. The option of x reflects risk-taking 
incentives of a bank.  
(5) The cost rate of capital is ρ, ρ is exogenous 
quantitative (the return on social average share 
ownership before tax), and for random x, ρ> p(x)x. 
Because x (the expected return of the loan with 
random risk selected by banks) is unlikely to be lower 
than C′(D) (marginal cost of deposit of any unit), 
x-C′(D)≥ 0.In the following analysis, we take total asset 
as risk asset so it is easy to understand.  
The regulation of capital adequacy requires  
Ｗ/（Ｗ+D）≥1/ｋ 
that is, D≤(ｋ-1)Ｗ  
ｋ is The inverse of capital adequacy rate. A 
comparatively lower k means higher capital adequacy.  
Here, the optimization issue of bank is:  
Max ｐ(ｘ)[ｘ(Ｗ+D)-C(D)]-ρＷ                    (1) 
ｘ,D 
ｓ.ｔ. D≤(ｋ-1)Ｗ 
The objective function is the non-decreasing 
function of D, which is:  
∂ {p(x)[x(W + D) - C(D)] -ρＷ}/ ∂ D = p(x)[x - 
C′(D)] ≥ 0                                                                               (2) 
In the condition allowed by capital adequacy , banks 
definitely try to absorb deposit as much as they could. 
For this reason, the restricting condition is changed to D 
= (k - 1) W. At the same time, Lagrangian function is 
formed： 
 
The derivative of x in (3) is given by : 
p′(x)[x(W + D)- C(D)]+ p(x)(W + D) = 0          (4) 
The derivative of D in (3) is given by  : 
 p(x)[x - C′(D)] + λ = 0                                       (5) 
The derivative of λ in (3) is given by :    
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D - (k - 1)W = 0                                                 （6） 
The optimized value induced from previous 
formation is marked as xr and Dr. 
For a bank, if the restriction on capital adequacy is 
tight, there must be Dr = (k -1)W, and take it into (4), the 
following will be achieved: 
p′(xr){xrkW-C[(k-1)W]}+p(xr)kW=0                 （7） 
By differential of (7)， the relation between the 
requirement of capital adequacy and bank’s choice of 
optimized risk-taking is given by ： 
 
As a result, the higher requirement the capital 
adequacy is (the lower k is, the higher 1/k is), the lower 
requirement of a bank has on the expected return. In a 
simpler term, banks prefer items with lower risk loan. It 
can be safely concluded that higher requirement on 
capital adequacy and wide introduction of accurate 
evaluation model on credit risk would take effects on 
risk-taking incentives and reduce bank’s choice for 
potential risk.  
 
3.  CREDIT CRUNCH UNDER THE 
REGULATION OF CAPITAL ADEQUACY  
 
Apart from reducing loan risk-taking incentives, 
another essential effect of capital adequacy regulations 
credit crunch, which has been widely researched by 
economists. The demonstration on American bank data 
by Hancock and Wilcox (1997) shows requirement of 
capital adequacy will cause a decline of loan to real 
estate. The same result is obtained by the Peek and 
Rosengren(1997) demonstration on Japan’s estate. Also, 
the demonstration of Korea’s banks and 
macro-economic data by G. Choi (2000) indicates 
capital adequacy regulation conducted after financial 
crisis led to a drop of banking loan, which had a direct 
negative effect on small and middle sized enterprises 
relying on them. Similarly, Maria C. (2002) investigated 
some developing countries and this phenomenon was 
also revealed in those countries, where regulation of 
capital adequacy was implemented. No wonder why 
Basel Committee claimed in a report in 1999: “Some 
evidence show that during economic recession in U.S. 
and Japan, the pressure on regulation of banking capital, 
to some degree, limited the loan of these time period and 
resulted in downturn of other economic body.” Mr. 
Richard Syron, president of the Federal Reserve. Bank 
of Boston, coined the expression “capital crunch”  
In order to analyze the variations of capital adequacy, 
especially the effects when increase requirement of it, 
the following model is taken into account:  
Hypothesis:  
(1) All assets of banking sectors is loan only and the 
loan is distributed to two kinds of enterprises: high-risk 
and high-profit; low-risk and low-profit. So there is：      
DWLLL +=+= 21  
 L indicates Loan issued by a bank, W represents 
Bank capital funds and D is the savings sponged up by a 
bank. 
（2）The return on loans is a discrete, dense, and 
listing random variable within the interval [0, 1] and 
function increases by degrees. The loan is only 
distributed to two kinds of enterprises, so the sample 
≈
R  
is 2, the returning ratio of high return loan is α … the 
ratio of low return loan is … β 。 In this condition, the 
probability of related event is )()( αα pRP ==
≈
，
)()( ββ pRP ==≈ 。  
（3）Suppose average interest rates of banks is ϕ , 
the payment of interest rates is 。  
(4) Suppose the ratio of capital adequacy is 
k
u 1= ，and 1>k ,obviously a comparatively lower k 
means higher capital adequacy 
When ignoring other weak related conditions, the 
profit of banks is   
 
Because 1L and 2L  are unlikely more than L, while 
the requirement for ratio of capital adequacy is 
u
L
W ≥ ， So the optimizing profit of banks will convert 
into the following linear programming:  
WDLpLp ϕϕββαα −−+=Θ 21 )()(max    
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(9) 
s．t．       
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−≤
<
<
 
In order to use pure matrix to make a solution for the 
foresaid question, three relaxation variables 
321 ,, εεε are introduced to change inequality into 
equality. The initial equation equals extremum of 
solution  
 
whereas the limitation is:  
The pure matrix is listed as follows in Table 1:  
 
Table 1 shows us that when 
( ) ( )00000032121 =εεεDLL
 
The equation has a BFS（Basic Feasible Solution）, 
and WBFS ϕ−= ,but obviously it is not the optimal 
one .From this BFS , we can get the optimal answer via 
the technological method of Pivot Step. We have 
noticed that the modulus of L1 is negative，by some 
transactions ,Table 2 is given：  
 This matrix means： 
 
 
According to the initial assumption ， here 
is. Equation (12) indicates increasing 3ε  is an effective 
method to obtain more profits after enhance the 
requirement of capital adequacy. As the foresaid 
assumption，increasing 3ε  means constricting D. Since 
L＝W+D， L is constricted accordingly,Here is: 
↓⎯→⎯↓⎯→⎯↑⎯→⎯↑ LDu 3ε    
Credit scale and capital adequacy ratio vary in the 
adverse direction ， 
0<
du
dL
 or 
0>
dk
dL
。 
 It is reasonable for a bank to reduce scale of liability 
so as to meet higher ratio of capital adequacy. Also, it is 
easy and convenient for a bank to adjust scale of 
liability since the cost is lower than capital funds, which 
enables banks to increase ratio of capital adequacy even 
without supplementing funds. Therefore, here is a 
condition of one-way intersection with absolute 
value: du
dW
du
dL >
.This means facing the variations of 
capital adequacy, scale of liability is more sensitive than 
capital funds. This passive solution is a headache of 
regulation authorities, which is far away from initial 
expectations.  
 
4.  LENDING OF BANKS UNDER 
REGULATION OF CAPITAL 
ADEQUACY  
 
As discussed above, regulation of capital adequacy 
would affect credit behavior of banks in two ways: one 
is to reduce risk-taking incentives of loan option; the 
other is to cause credit crunch. What we are now to 
analyze is this contraction is a same-rate one to all loans 
or it is selective. What the criterion are if it’s selective? 
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This involves analysis on loan option with regulation of 
capital adequacy.  
      We set a simple linear programming model to 
analyze bank behavior on loan under capital adequacy 
regulation.  
       Hypothesis: 
(1) L indicates Loan issued by a bank, W represents 
Bank capital funds and D is the savings sponged up by a 
bank; 
(2) The loan is distributed to two enterprises：a small 
sized one and a large sized one;  
 (3) On account of borrower’s default and recovery 
of loan has intense relation with borrower’s scale, take 
all sorts of risk elements into account，the risk and the 
enterprise scale are proportional; 
 (4) X1  represents the distribution to the large sized 
enterprise and X2 indicates the distribution to the small 
sized one .Both of them depend on b: incentives for 
risk-taking. To the management of bank, different b 
represents different risk-taking incentives. As the risk 
and the enterprise scale are proportional，while banks 
are born to be risk averse，that is why X1／ X2 =f(b) ≥1; 
(5) profits Z: net income of loan subtracts loss on 
loan. 
    Assume the ratios of net income on loans to small 
sized enterprises and large sized enterprises are  and 
2r , the  ratios of loss on loans to small sized enterprises 
and large sized enterprises are 1s and 2s . 
The target function and conditions are as following: 
 
       To be more visual, we can get geometrical Figure 1. 
The triangle area BOE includes all values that satisfy 
the three limitations. So as to obtain the optimal loan 
combination, profit functional curve Z move to right, 
which means more total profits. At point E，not only the 
loan combination satisfy the three limitations but also 
maximize profit. 
But how dose the loan combination change after 
capital adequacy regulation is strengthened? Following 
the preceding analyses, when capital adequacy 
regulation is strengthened, bank is like to change in two 
aspects: one is risk-taking incentives, the other is credit 
crunch。How do this two aspects influence the loan 
combination? f(b) is positively related to incentive for 
risk-taking. In other words, bank would like to loan to 
large sized enterprises as much as possible, Line OD 
would become more flat. Credit crunch means less total 
loan，line AB move to left. In the Figure 2 broken line 
shows us this change. By error testing ,we get  E′。At 
point E，the selected loan combination satisfies the 
condition of strengthening capital adequacy regulation 
and  other two limitations ,maximizes profit as well。
Here, at E′, OF′ indicates loan to the large sized 
enterprise, OG′ indicates loan to the small sized 
enterprise. Obviously, OF′ is similar to OF，while OG′ is 
conspicuous different from OG.  
As can be seen, when regulation of capital adequacy 
is strengthened, given lower risk-taking incentives and 
credit crunch, banks will considerably reduce loan to 
small sized enterprises with potential high risks while at 
the same time the loans to large enterprises are almost 
non-affected.  
 
5.  DATA IN HUBEI PROVINCE  
 
The following analyses of credit behavior in Hubei 
Province are based on Capital Supervision of 
Commercial Banks issued in March, 2004. Compared 
with the Principle and Discipline of Supervision on the 
Ratio of Assets and Liability issued in 1996, the new 
Supervision is much stricter on calculation of capital 
adequacy, which requires the calculation of commercial 
banks to be based on the fact that loan loss is ready for 
sufficient balance. This also requires a stricter criterion 
when estimating credit risk. As a consequence, the 
ration of capital adequacy will accordingly decline 
when the new Supervision is implemented. Except for 
commercial banks in Wuhan, all the other banks in 
Hubei province are the branches of state-owned or 
share-holding companies. This determines that the 
effects on strengthening capital adequacy would be seen 
from transactions by those branches. Therefore, the 
credit behavior in branch banks could also reflect the 
trend of whole enterprise. 
 The credit crunch in banks of Hubei Province adopt 
the index of international cases --- the ratio of loan in 
asset. The variation of index could indicate the bank’s 
preference of credit. We choose ten banks, they are 
China Construction Bank Hubei branch, Agricultural 
Bank of China Hubei branch, Bank of China Hubei 
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branch, Bank of Communications Hubei branch, China 
Everbright Bank Hubei branch, Huxia Bank Hubei 
branch, Shanghai Podong Development Bank Hubei 
branch, China Merchants Bank Hubei branch, WuHan 
City Bank Hubei branch respectively, the date are 
pooled over five years which from 2002-2006. Table 3 
below mainly describes the change of credit percentage 
in asset of sample banks in Hubei Province. It can be 
observed that in the process of adjusting capital 
adequacy, the decline of credit scale in asset is regular. 
The falling range of banks with different features is not 
obvious. All these illustrate that the adjustment of 
capital adequacy give a rise to a common credit 
contraction of banks. 
 
Source: Bankscope 
Influenced by capital adequacy adjusting, when 
reducing credit scale, each commercial bank focuses on 
high profit and low ratio of credit risk. They have severe 
censorship on new loan and controlling the increase of 
risk capital. According to our investigation with branch 
banks of Hubei Province, each bank improves their 
credit criterion in order to profit of risk asset. Take a 
branch as an example, its main business is to take asset 
to make up for debit. Its gross risk capital is large and 
their return of asset is comparatively low. After carrying 
out new Supervision, the branch began to re-arrange its 
structure and its gross risk capital declined. Thus, after 
the new Supervision, the choice of credit clients has 
been narrowed although in this cut-throat competitive 
market, each share-holding bank has to maintain capital 
accumulation so as to survive and develop. As the data 
of financial monitoring authority shown, the huge 
clients and small sized clients are unbalanced. Until the 
end of June, the radio of the former accounts for 58.8 
per cent while the latter compose only 10.27 per cent. 
This explains that the credit crunch takes major effects 
on middle and small sized enterprises.  
 
6.  CONCLUSION AND SUGGESTIONS  
 
The above analyses have shown the tight link between 
supervision of capital adequacy and banking loan option. 
The decline of risk-taking incentives and credit crunch 
under the supervising are mainly shown on loan option, 
especially take effects on the loan for small and middle 
sized enterprises. Currently in China, the compensatory 
system is absent and the access to adequate capital is 
limited. This explains why the effects are strikingly 
obvious.  
The following measures can be taken to relieve 
contraction effects so as to reduce impacts on small and 
middle sized enterprises and national economy.  
 
6.1  Fully developing capital market and 
promoting direct financing  
The status quo and current goal of capital mark of China 
determines the following considerations: enlarge stocks 
scale on the basis of economic redistribution and share 
reform, which encourage capital collecting from market 
and promote non-state owned outlet of financing; 
improve and optimizing structure of capital market, 
enlarge enterprise stocks, funding and circulation; 
strengthen system reform and establish capital market 
supervision and transaction which adapt to market 
economy.  
 
6.2  Introducing foreign-funding banks and 
broaden loan outlets  
Generally, the ratios of capital adequacy in 
foreign-funding banks are far higher than the minimum 
requirement (8%). According to data of Banker 
Magazine in 2003, the average ratio of 26 international 
banks was up to 11.61%, (the highest was 18.20%). 
SHBC was 13.30%, Societe Generale contributed 
12.51%，Union Bank of Switzerland accounted for 
15.70%。Sufficient funds enable these banks to be free 
from adjustment in a large scale when being supervised. 
Thus, the supervision of capital adequacy produces less 
contractual effects on foreign-funding banks. It has to 
be admitted that the importing of foreign-funding banks 
after joining in WTO takes significant role in reliving 
contractual effects of capital adequacy monitoring.  
In order to avoid macro-economic recession 
resulting from capital adequacy supervision on 
state-owned commercial banks, it is necessary to absorb 
foreign-funding banks. In short-term, it would increase 
competitive pressure of national banks. But in the long 
run, their entering into China’s market not only improve 
management of national banks but their high capital 
adequacy would effectively reduce contractual effects 
of capital supervision. This is also helpful for a stable 
macro-economy. Practically, Shanghai Bank transferred 
13% of equity to three foreign-funding banks in 2001. 
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Among them, SHBC participated the investment of 
shares for Shanghai Bank (8%), Shanghai Bank of 
Commerce (HK) made up 3%, and International 
Finance Corporation increased to 7%. This was proved 
to be an effective and efficient approach to attract 
foreign investment.  
 
6.3  Conducting elastic regulation of capital 
adequacy  
It is probability to conduct elastic supervision in china, 
namely different bank adopt different ratio .According 
to current situation , at the present stage , capital 
adequacy ratio of 8% is not compulsive to achieve and 
adopt a interim period .During this period ,with the ratio 
within 6%-7.5%,banks should adjust and establish 
capital base, enhance competitive strength ,accumulate 
experience, so as to be a commercial bank which 
manage independently. Finally achieve requirement 
level. 
After this interim period , our commercial banks are 
required to adopt minimum capital adequacy ratio of 
8%.Simultaneously,different bank adopt dissimilar 
risk-weighted assets ratio which higher than 8% 
actually. 
 
6.4  Introduce deposit insurance prudently 
The reputation guarantee offered by a nation and the 
deposit insurance have an identical capital structure 
effect, the asset effects of banks are totally different. 
That is to say, both will strengthen the loan 
encouragement and reduce the capital ratio. However, 
the former, due to the fact the national guarantee cannot 
form a supervision on capital adequacy, causes the 
regular actual capital to change into being aimless. At 
the same time, the bank owner is also the one to offer 
financial security, which separate the financial provider 
and owner. This extends the agency chain hence the 
investment of high risk, which produce current 25% bad 
debt of national banks. On the contrary, the latter one 
solved the constant deposit of bank clients. Also, it 
supervises capital adequacy, that is to increase capital 
adequacy to eliminate high risk investment and limit 
banking speculation, to reduce the possibility of 
bankruptcy. Therefore, when the property right is 
confirmed by national banks and commercialized 
banking is launched, to replace national reputation 
guarantee with deposit insurance  is a necessity to fully 
utilize capital adequacy and transfer national capital 
into market.  
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